DETERMINISM

CHOICE

&

FREEDOM

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COONPROM

จรัญ ขุนพรหม
DETERMINISM, CHOICE AND FREEDOM
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The thesis attached hereto, entitled DETERMINISM, CHOICE AND FREEDOM, prepared and submitted by Gerund Coonprom in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts is hereby accepted.

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Sir:

This is to formally endorse the thesis of Mr. Gerund Coonprom, a graduate student of philosophy, for defense before an oral examination panel. The thesis titled “Determinism, Choice and Freedom” reflects quite an extensive review of the literature on the problem of freedom and includes a commendable effort to argue for the possibility of freedom in the face of seemingly formidable arguments woven by the determinists. Beyond merely trying to meet the arguments by the determinists, Mr. Coonprom also tried to indicate conditions that would make freedom meaningful for man.

Professor Andresito E. Acuna who has himself done work in this area served as Reader.

Yours truly,

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Sir:

I have the honor to recommend the approval of the M.A. thesis submitted by Mr. Gerund Coonprom entitled “Determinism, Choice and Freedom.”

I have critically examined the thesis of Mr. Coonprom and I am satisfied that his work has met the requirements of an M. A. Thesis.

It appears to me that Mr. Coonprom’s thesis represents a distinctive contribution towards the clarification of the problem of freedom and particularly of the possibility of freedom of choice.

Sincerely yours,

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In appreciation of their love
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GERUND COONPROM
ABSTRACT

Determinism, the view that is based on the principle of causality, proves to be highly probable and quite successful in physical sciences. But in social sciences, especially in the area of psychological phenomena, it becomes less distinct. Psychological determinism cannot be fully explained in terms of physical determinism. Man is more than just a physical system. His behavior must be understood in terms of conduction.

Because of some fundamental differences between the two kinds of determinism, a possibility of freedom arises. Since man is an active agent, given a choice between alternatives, he can choose accordingly. While it is acknowledged that most of man’s choices are part of his conditioning, his freedom of choice can occur. However, freedom of choice does not mean a negation of determinism. Rather, it is freedom within determinism. Two conditions are necessary to obtain freedom of choice. First, the range of alternatives must be of equal probability of being chosen. Second, when the range of alternatives is not of equal probability, the more probable alternative must not be compelling and the less probable alternative must be within the power of the choosing agent. In other words, there must be no compulsion. The absence of compulsion does not necessarily mean that the range of alternatives is of equal probability.

Thus, man’s freedom is considered in relation to his power to choose or not to choose, to do or not to do. Since freedom of choice is related to power, mental power will be given a priority. Here is where awareness comes into the picture. The more a person is aware of relevant data in a choosing situation, the easier he can attain freedom of choice. That is, he will not be predisposed by any hidden compulsion, whether it is in psychological, physical, or institutional forms, to choose one alternative rather than another. To overcome any compulsion, so that a condition of freedom of choice may be attained, awareness and power are certainly needed. Finally, a kind of education that will help increase one’s awareness and the possibility of reaching freedom is recommended.
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Introduction

The problem of determinism and freedom has been debated since time immemorial. It is one of the most difficult and most controversial issues that thinkers have grappled with. This dispute has been coming back again and again because it directly deals with the nature of man. Today, as never before, the issue is becoming more alive because of the advance of modern technology and science that has placed man, the individual, in a dangerous position. Man is becoming more and more controlled, if not by his fellowman, then by his own discoveries and inventions. His behavior is being discussed in terms of conditioning or programming. Thus, robotism has posed a great threat to his essential nature: freedom. Man's freedom of choice has often been labeled as an illusion. The questions that we are facing are: Can freedom of choice be meaningful? Under what conditions is man free? What is the state of his freedom and dignity now and in the future to come?

The debate between determinism and freedom has begun since the time of ancient Greece, from the sixth to the fourth centuries B.C. The concept of ‘necessity’ of the universe is first upheld by Thales, who says that necessity is omnipotent and that it exercises empire over everything. For Pythagoras, the world is invested by necessity. Parmenides and Democritus also maintain that there is nothing in the world but what is necessary. On the side of freedom, Epicurus first introduces that chance deviations occur in the swirl of the atoms. Thus, in the first century B.C., Lucretius, the great philosopher poet of ancient Rome, adopts the system of Epicurus and describes the 'swerve of the atoms that makes freedom possible. The problem of determinism and freedom has also been one of the essential issues in religion.

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1 There are several techniques used in behavior control, such as propaganda, indoctrination, brainwashing, thought reform, behavior modification, hypnosis, drugs, electroshock, ultrasonic sound, radiation, etc. For details see Walter Bowart, Operation Mind Control (Great Britain: Fontana, 1978); Vance Packard, The People Shapers (London: Futura Publications Limited, 1978); and J. A. C. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion (Penguin Books, 1977).
The deterministic law of Karma in Buddhism and Hinduism settles a person's status in his successive reincarnations. The doctrine of preordained destiny or Kismet has been stressed from the beginning of Mohammedanism. Christianity itself has been divided by the doctrines of divine predestination and human free will, which give rise to Calvinism and Arminianism.²

To appreciate the controversy more deeply, the following stories may be illustrated. The first story is told about a Calvinist, who believes in the doctrine of divine predestination, and a Methodist, who holds the doctrine of human free will. The two met on their way to worship on a Sunday morning. The Calvinist remarked, “You were foreordained to go to church today.” To which the Methodist replied, “Is that so?” He turned around and went home.³ The second story is told by William James about a man who found himself in a dilemma. He saw two buildings on opposite sides of the street, one with the sign ‘Determinists Club,’ and the other with the sign ‘League for Free Will.’ The man first went into the Determinists Club, and was asked why he wanted to join the Club. Having replied, “Because I choose to,” he was thrown out. Then, he went to the League for Free Will, and again was asked a similar question. He replied, “Because I have no other choice,” and again was thrown out.⁴

The debate between determinism and freedom has thus generated several different viewpoints. Those who hold free will in its extreme form are called Libertarians, including many super naturalists and idealists. They maintain that the will is free, or that the decisions to act voluntarily are not causally governed by prior


³ Ibid., p. 21.

conditions. On the other hand, those who hold determinism differ on the degrees as to the extent to which the will is regarded as being determined. They are divided into so-called hard and soft determinists, the former holding to rigid determinism while the latter preserving an element of freedom. The hard determinists are sometimes called mechanistic determinists. The third view is represented by those who deny incompatibility between freedom and determinism. They say that the apparent conflict is due to various conceptual errors, and assert that it is a pseudo-problem.

There is no question that the problem of determinism and freedom involves some linguistic perplexity. But the question is, Does the problem solely arise out of a linguistic confusion, or is there something more? Hume, for instance, contends that the dispute has been merely verbal. Along this line; Schlick also argues that the controversy begins with an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of ‘law.’ He distinguishes between prescriptive law and descriptive law; the former prescribes how something should behave as in the case of moral and civil laws, while the latter describes how something does in fact behave as in the case of natural law. He holds that ‘compulsion,’ the absence of which is freedom, is not applied to the natural laws which he also includes psychological laws. ‘Compulsion,’ according to Schlick, occurs when man is prevented from realizing his natural desires. This kind of analysis has led some philosophers to maintain that freedom is meaningful only in an institutional setting. Another linguistic confusion rests on the meaning of ‘self.’ As

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pointed out by de Bono, responsibility and punishment will depend on where one draws the boundary for self, whether self includes the determining factors or is supposed to stand apart from them. Such concepts as ‘law,’ ‘caused,’ ‘determined,’ ‘free,’ and others certainly contribute to the perplexity of the issue.

Besides, it is not only the ambiguity of the term ‘free,’ but also what it is that is free or unfree has not been agreed upon. Some talk about free will; others discuss about the freedom of overt action, or limit their analysis to the freedom of choice. For instance, in the case of Lamont, he stresses the phrase ‘freedom of choice’ because of, he contends, the theological connotations and confusions associated with the term ‘free will’ and because there is nothing identifiable as ‘the will’ which is responsible for a choice. He maintains that the whole personality does the choosing and that the whole personality carries out the actions entailed in the choice.

Certainly, more exact linguistic analyses are needed because language, as pointed out by Hampshire, changes. But a linguistic analysis should not be overemphasized to the extent of neglecting empirical foundations of concepts which exist in their own right. A linguistic analysis may be helpful at certain stages, but we must go beyond words to things in themselves.

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The problem of determinism and freedom, therefore, is not wholly linguistic in nature. It also arises from the lack of concrete empirical evidence. It has become one of the most difficult issues because it deals with the existence of innate ideas. In dealing with such a problem, the empiricist and the rationalist philosophers have constantly combined philosophical analysis with appeals to psychological evidence.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus, in the following discussion both determinism and freedom will be examined. However, the discussion on determinism will be limited to only physical determinism and psychological determinism which draws its support from the former. The discussion will begin, then, with physical determinism, its basic assumptions and its justification in relation to the problem of certainty. In psychological determinism three main contemporary theories: behavioristic, psychoanalytic, and cognitive theories will be examined.

It will be pointed out that any single theory does not suffice in explaining and understanding human behavior. Human behavior is a synthesis that must be understood in terms of conductive rather than reduction. Moreover, the analysis on the relation between physical determinism and psychological determinism, which falls under the section of behavior and explanation, shows that there are certain fundamental differences between the two kinds of determinism. Psychological laws cannot be fully explained in terms of physical laws. While physical determinism is highly probable, psychological determinism seems to be less so. These fundamental differences give rise to a possibility of freedom.

To understand freedom, we begin therefore with the concept of choice. It will be argued and maintained that genuine, possible alternatives need not be one and only one in every choosing situation, and that a person could have done otherwise.

Freedom of choice occurs under two conditions: first, when the range of alternatives is of equal probability of being chosen; second, when there is no compulsion in the more probable alternative and the less probable alternative is still within the power of the choosing agent. Freedom of choice will be seen in relation to man’s natural power of self-determination. It is within this power to do or not to do that freedom finds its meaning. Since choice is a mental activity, we put more emphasis on mental power. This power, as expressed in awareness, serves to increase one’s insight into the range of alternatives, the situational conditions, and the controlling variables. Thus, the more a person is aware of these factors, the more freely he can choose and/or act. The discussion will be concluded, then, with a recommendation of the kind of education that will help promote one’s awareness of himself and of the world around him, a condition that is necessary to the attainment and enlargement of his freedom. It is hoped that the discussion will deepen the understanding of the problem on hand, and perhaps contribute to a possible solution.

I. Physical Determinism

As mentioned above, the history of determinism begins as early as the time of ancient Greece. The Greeks are the first people to abandon the animistic approach to their environment. They differentiate between events that take place as a result of natural causality and actions that are caused by volitions. It is Democritus (460-370 B.C.) who first attempts to explain phenomena in a naturalistic way. But his approach is later superseded by a metaphysical approach of Socrates and Plato, who ask a question of ‘why’ things happen, and not ‘how’ they happen. This approach leads to the ultimate cause of events which they call ‘the Mind.’ Plato regards Mind as the principle of motion and order of the world. He holds that

“mind is infinite and self-ruled and is mixed with nothing.... It is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it possesses all knowledge and the greatest power.... Over all is mind and ruler. And over the whole revolving universe
mind held sway, so that it caused it to revolve in the beginning.”

This teleological approach, as pointed out by Vivian, dominates the thinking of the Western world until the Renaissance. But with the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and the new world, view begins to change from the search for final causes to efficient causes. Thus, physical determinism primarily deals with efficient causes.

A. Causality

To understand determinism and its claims, we must first understand the principle of causality. According to Bittle, the principle of causality is an outgrowth of the principle of sufficient reason, which in turn is a development of the principle of identity and the principle of non-contradiction. The principle of identity simply says, ‘A thing is what it is,’ and for the principle of non-contradiction, ‘A thing is what it is, and it can be no other; if it could be another, it would not be what it is,’ These two principles give rise to the principle of sufficient reason which says that ‘Everything must have a sufficient reason to be what it is.’ Thus, the sufficient reason for the existence and being of a thing must lie either in the thing itself or in some other thing. If it has the sufficient reason for its existence and being in itself, then it is self-sufficient, On the other hand, if it has the sufficient reason for its existence and being in another thing, then it must be brought into being by that other thing. The principle of causality is thus derived: ‘Whatever happens (occurs, changes, begins to be) has a cause’; or, ‘Whatever is contingent...has a cause for its existence

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and being;’ or, simply, ‘Every effect has a cause.’\textsuperscript{17}

Determinism has been defined, therefore, as the view that all events are caused. Some determinists like Blanshard\textsuperscript{18} further assert that an event is caused in the sense that it is so connected with some preceding event that unless the latter had occurred the former would not have occurred. “By determinism, then,” says Blanshard, “I mean the view that every event A is so connected with a latter event B that, given A, B must occur.”\textsuperscript{19} Blanshard seems to allow the use of the word ‘must’ in a logical sense. This notion of causal necessity is held by some earlier philosophers. Spinoza, for instance, writes that “nothing in the universe is contingent, but...all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner....”\textsuperscript{20}

Is causal connection one of logical necessity? This question on the relation between cause and effect has been of great interest to many philosophers down the history. Two British empiricists John Locke and David Hume set out to show this connection. Unlike Democritus, however, who thinks that causality is a characteristic of the events themselves, Locke and Hume believe that causality is something that man brings to events. Locke\textsuperscript{21} holds that the natural phenomena are analogous to the movements of our bodies as a result of the acts of will. But he falls short of explaining how it works in natural objects, nor how the will produces effects in

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 307.


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 4.


bodily movements. He acknowledges that “how a thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how anybody should produce any thought in the mind.”

Hume, on the other hand, attempts to discover causality in the external world. But after a painstaking job he does not find any particular ‘quality’ in all the objects which are capable of being causes or effects. Hume concludes, therefore, that causality is nothing more than what has been accustomed in past experience. It is this “customary determination of the mind” that we refer to when we talk of the “necessary connection” between cause and effect. Hume writes: “It is therefore by experience only that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another.” Hume’s analysis is summarized by Alfred J. Ayer into three points:

“first...the relation of cause and effect was not logical in character, since any proposition asserting a causal connexion could be denied without self-contradiction, secondly ... causal laws were not analytically derived from experience, since they were not deducible from any finite number of experiential propositions, and, thirdly...it was a mistake to analyse propositions asserting causal connexions in terms of a relation of necessitation which held between particular events, since it was impossible to conceive of any observations which would have the slightest tendency to establish the existence of such a relation.”

The problem of causality is also dealt with by Kant, who attempts to synthesize rationalism and empiricism. For Kant, the proposition, ‘Every effect has a cause,’ is a priori, but not a pure proposition, because the concept of alteration or


change underlying the effect is a concept which can be derived only from experience. Other contemporary philosophers like Russell\textsuperscript{25} conceive of causation as a function. As Russell writes, “The law of universal causation...may be enunciated as follows. There are such invariable relations between different events at the same or different times that, given the state of the whole universe throughout any finite time, however short, every previous and subsequent event can theoretically be determined as a function of the given events during that time.”

We have seen that the proposition, ‘All events are caused,’ can be very ambiguous. This is partly due to a linguistic confusion based on the term ‘cause,’ which has been used arbitrarily and indiscriminately of all events. Hume has pointed out that there is no particular ‘quality’ in all objects in the causal relation. The notion of causality can be expressed in a number of different senses. According to Ayer\textsuperscript{26}, we commonly speak of causality in four main types of case. The first class consists of the cases in which a generalization is explained by a wider theory, e.g., the effects of gravitation or of electricity. The second class consists of the cases in which the behavior of an object is explained in terms of its composition or its structure. The third class is the cases in which a disposition, or a state of mind, is said to be the cause of its manifestation. Then, the fourth class is the cases in which a causal statement links two states of affairs at the same observational or theoretical level, e.g., a causal relation between two events. Thus, for example, the question ‘What causes a balloon to go up?’ can be causally explained in different ways: (1) because it is lighter than what the gravitation can pull it down, or (2) because of its gaseous composition which tends to rise into the atmosphere, or (3) because of Mr. Smith's certain disposition that leads him to cut the string that ties the balloon to a pole, or (4) because the act of cutting the string causes the event of the rising of the balloon into the atmosphere.

Other philosophers, like Aristotle,\textsuperscript{27} distinguish causality in four different kinds: (1) material, (2) formal, (3) efficient, and (4) final. We can see, then, that the notion of ‘cause’ may be used in different senses. Because of these different senses and the difficulty in establishing a one-to-one correspondence in the causal relation, contemporary social scientists speak in terms of function and probability.

B. Probability

Since the relation between cause and effect is not one of logical necessity, probability would be the best conclusion. The notion of probability finds its basis on the principle of induction which in turn rests on the fact that nature behaves in a uniform manner. Hume does not find a justification for the principle of induction, but he does not reject it in practice. In the words of Ayer, Hume says, “Logically, we ought to be complete skeptics, but in practice we shall continue to be guided by our natural beliefs.”\textsuperscript{28} As for Ayer himself, he contends that the justification of inductive reasoning lies in its success in practice. He says that no better justification is required.\textsuperscript{29} Pollock,\textsuperscript{30} on the other hand, thinks that the attempt of justifying induction is wrong-headed and must be forsaken. He points out that the principle of induction serves as an instrument in our making justified judgments about the world; it involves in the justification conditions of our concepts. He, like Strawson, maintains that we cannot justify induction inductively. It has been suggested, therefore, that a solution to the problem may be attained through an analysis of the


\textsuperscript{28} Alfred J. Ayer, Probability and Evidence, op. cit., p. 5.


meaning of ‘justification,’ rather than induction itself.\textsuperscript{31}

Whether induction is justifiable or not is not our concern here, but one thing we can be sure of is that inductive reasoning will yield only a probability. The degrees of this probability, as pointed out by Bittle, depend upon the extensiveness and reliability of our knowledge of things and facts.\textsuperscript{32} One example of ‘ultimate’ uncertainty lies in the nature of atom. Scientists have tried to predict the behavior of an electron in atom. It has been found and maintained by some physicists like Heisenberg, Eddington, and Born that electrons do not behave in a deterministic manner. Thus, Heisenberg has introduced the principle of indeterminacy in which he describes that we are unable for a given time to predict with accuracy both the momentum and the position of an electron in its orbit around the nucleus of an atom.\textsuperscript{33} The principle of indeterminacy may not prove, I think, that determinism is false. It may simply show that our knowledge of causal law has limits, which may be due to the nature of our method of observation. At any rate, Heisenberg has demonstrated that the degree of probability with which we can know the actual state of the physical world can never be absolute.

Four important points have been derived from the preceding examination of physical determinism: first, the principle of causality is not one of logical necessity; second, the concept of ‘cause’ can be used in different senses or levels of meaning; third, the concept of causality is being considered in terms of function by social scientists; and, fourth, the principle of induction from which causality is inferred never yields absolute certainty, but only degrees of probability. From the success of physical sciences, we may conclude that physical determinism is highly probable. If


\textsuperscript{32} Celestine N. Bittle, op. cit., p. 346.

physical determinism itself only yields degrees of probability, we want to know how probable psychological determinism will be.

II. Psychological Determinism

The dispute between determinism and freedom has often been associated with human actions rather than events in the physical world. The crux of the determinist’s claim lies in relation to human behavior. From what holds true in nature the determinist assumes that it must also be true with man. Thus, the questions that we are facing become more complex, because psychological determinism is inferred from physical determinism. But does physical determinism apply to psychological determinism? Can man be studied like any other physical objects? Is man nothing but another kind of machine? Can his behavior be fully explained in a mechanistic manner? Will science ever explain every detail of human behavior? Kurtz,\textsuperscript{34} for one, does not believe that “one can prove conclusively that man can be scientifically studied.” He maintains that science requires an open field and whose ultimate test is pragmatic. It has been pointed out that the science of modern psychology is still essentially Newtonian.\textsuperscript{35} That is, while physics has changed since Newton’s time, psychology has retained his world view which is mechanistic in character.\textsuperscript{36}

We are facing, then, with the problem of the relationship between physical and psychological determinism. Does determinism hold true both in physical and psychological phenomena? If it does, can psychological determinism be explained in

\textsuperscript{34} Paul W. Kurtz, \textit{Decision and the Condition of Man} (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1965), pp. 22-25.

\textsuperscript{35} See Joseph F. Rychlak, \textit{A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), pp. 113-118.

terms of physical determinism? Some thinkers like Kenny, as opposed to J. B. Watson, hold that determinism may work at the physiological level, but not at the psychological level. It would be appropriate and beneficial at this point to examine the main contemporary psychological theories on human behavior.

A. Behavioristic Theories

Behaviorism in its crudest form denies all mental states. It holds that there is no conscious experience, but only instances of overt and observable behavior. Mental state like pain, for instance, is the same as pain-behavior. The argument of behaviorism runs this way:

“Since experiences are private, it is impossible for one man to know what experiences another man is having. Therefore, if being in a given state of mind involves having certain kinds of experience, one man can never know that another man is in a given state of mind. If mental-concept words referred to inner experiences, we could not learn their meanings, and we could never know whether we were applying them correctly or incorrectly. But it is clear that we often do know that other men are angry, drowsy, anxious, and so on. Since all that we can know of other men is their behavior, it is to their behavior that words of this type must refer.”

There are, of course, many forms and meanings of behaviorism ranging from that of J. B. Watson to that of B. P. Skinner. Beloff mentions two broad types of behaviorism: the methodological behaviorists, including most experimental


psychologists, who accept Watson's programs, but ignore or reject his thesis; and the logical behaviorists, including most linguistic philosophers, who accept Watson's thesis, but repudiate his programs. Ryle, for instance, develops a doctrine of logical behaviorism, according to which talk about mental states is a way of referring to actual or potential patterns of behavior. For Ryle, anger consists in angry behavior, either actualized, or else inhibited by certain conditions. Thus, the logical behaviorists do not necessarily deny mental states. On the contrary, I believe, they must assume mental states of some kind. As Ryle himself points out, other people are very often able to determine what a person's mind is -- his thoughts, mental powers, and emotions at least -- and sometimes are in a better position to do so than the person himself is.

In denying mental states, I think behaviorism encounters a difficult problem of successful pretense. For in the case of successful pretense we are not certain whether the behavior exhibited is the right one. The behaviorist will not be able to distinguish between real and unreal behavior. The behaviorist makes a mistake in identifying mental or psychological state with overt and observable behavior. Though all unobservable can only be known in relation to sense experience and behavior, it does not mean that the former is reducible or identical with the latter. As a method of studying human behavior from one particular angle of approach, behaviorism has no right to claim that whatever does not fit into its method does not exist. To make such a judgment is to express a value judgment contrary to science which is supposed to be value-neutral. We are also reminded that the inconceivability of anything is not a

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41 See Vere C. Chappell, op. cit.

42 David L. Miller, op. cit., p. 5.

sufficient reason for supposing that it does not exist or happen. Moreover, the argument of behaviorism stated above begins from another person's point of view, not from the first-person’s point of view. Certainly, other people cannot directly observe my state of mind, but I, who experience it, can. All knowledge of other mind, therefore, must begin with the first-person based on the argument from analogy.

Leaving the mental state for the moment, we will now consider another form of behaviorism which is gaining a lot of popularity today. This is the position of B. F. Skinner, whose view is known as ‘Operant Behaviorism.’ This view differs, however, from the stimulus-response theory, which describes all behavior in terms of stimuli and responses, or that each response is preceded by certain stimuli. While the S-R theory seems to be mechanistic, Skinner's theory assumes determinism that is more flexible. His explanation of human behavior seems to coincide with Darwin’s explanation in the theory of evolution. Skinner explains behavior in terms of conditioning of the responses to stimuli, according to which successful responses, in the sense of reaching some goal in the past, will tend to increase in frequency, whereas less successful responses will tend to become extinct.

Skinnerian psychology can be summarized into three propositions: “(1) what a person does often has consequences that alter his behavior, (2) the consequences arise in the environment, and (3) the environment operates on a contingency basis; that is, it yields rewards and/or punishments only after certain acts are performed.”

Skinner maintains that a man behaves, not because of the consequences which are to

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follow his behavior, but because of the consequences which have followed similar behavior in the past. This is what he calls the Law of Effect or operant conditioning. Past consequences in terms of rewards, threats, and punishments shape the patterns of behavior that make up human personalities. Since these consequences arise in the environment, Skinner argues that all causes of behavior lie, therefore, outside the individual. The biological substratum itself is determined by prior events in a genetic process. Thus, it is the environment that determines the individual, even when he alters the environment.47 “Men,” says Skinner in his book Verbal Behavior, “will never become originating centers of control, because their behavior will itself be controlled....”48 For Skinner, human intention is just a part of conditioning. He says, “A person acts intentionally... not in the sense that he possesses an intention which he then carries out, but in the sense that his behavior has been strengthened by consequences.” Skinner also regards value judgment as a part of conditioning. ‘Good’ refers to positive reinforcement, and ‘bad’ to negative reinforcement. Even the ‘self,’ Skinner maintains, is nothing but a repertoire of behavior appropriate to a given set of contingencies.49

Skinnerian psychology has generated many criticisms both from social scientists and, more particularly from those thinkers who uphold human freedom and dignity. These criticisms center around Skinner’s alleged extrapolations of human behavior from animal behavior. Chomsky,50 in his review of Skinner's Verbal

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48 Quoted by Joseph F. Rychlak, op. cit., p. 225.


Behavior, presents some objections along this line. The first objection concerns with the definition of units. According to Chomsky, Skinner at first stresses the need for empirical solutions in his work on animal behavior, but later he frames his explanation of human behavior in terms of units defined on intuitive grounds, which Chomsky thinks is tantamount to an abandonment of experimental enquiry for speculation. Besides, Skinner seems to extrapolate from rather limited aspects of behavior of rats and pigeons. Taylor\textsuperscript{51} also reacts strongly to such extrapolations in assuming that there are no differences of level in behavior between more rigid and more intelligent beings.

Although the validity of Chomsky’s criticism against Skinner will depend on further empirical findings, we assume that there are certain differences of behavior in the higher and in the lower animal.\textsuperscript{52} One of the differences is that the behavior of animals is very insensitive to reinforcement when even a relatively short delay is interposed between a response and the reinforcing event that is contingent upon it, whereas human behavior arises when consequences are not immediate and there is no apparent chain of intermediate responses and secondary reinforcement to bridge the gap.\textsuperscript{53} Human beings sometimes behave in a way that is appropriate to its consequences which is not similar to any previous behavior. A man, for instance, may be bribed to do something that he has never done before.\textsuperscript{54} A man may do something

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{52}] See also Andresito E. Acuna, “Notes on Chomsky's Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior,” A reprint from The Diliman Review (April, 1969), 183-198.
\item[\textsuperscript{53}] See R. A. Boakes and M. S. Halliday, op. cit. p. 372.
\item[\textsuperscript{54}] Ibid., pp. 371-372.
\end{itemize}
for certain reasons, and those reasons do not all lie in the past.\textsuperscript{55} This fundamental difference arises from the fact that animal's actions are guided by emotional impulse, based on the estimate of the effect here and now; man, however, judges not only on an emotional impulse basis, but also on the basis of abstract and long-range considerations.\textsuperscript{56} This power to reflect on the past as well as on the future, which distinguishes man from other living organisms, makes it possible for man to avoid what seems inevitable in his future.\textsuperscript{57}

Another remarkable observation comes from Hamlyn who points out that conditioning of animal behavior is what happens to an animal, not to what it does.\textsuperscript{58} Certainly, animal behavior is affected by the process of conditioning or examining. The animal may not behave in a cage the same way it does in its natural environment. As a matter of fact, human behavior is also affected by the process of examination or when put under study.

As a whole, we see that Skinnerian psychology seems to put too little emphasis on the central role of human thought. His thesis commits man to external determinism. Although he is right to some extent, we must maintain that man is not just passive, but also active. Man does react and act. We must distinguish behavior that actually operates on and changes the environment from behavior that represents


\textsuperscript{57} See Peter Stoler, “Puzzling Out Man’s Ascent,” Time (November 7, 1977), p. 51.

an effect of the environment on the organism.\textsuperscript{59} To understand human behavior, therefore, we must approach it from purposive explanation. Greenspan\textsuperscript{60} has demonstrated it by taking a less extreme case of conditioning and examines the stages of behavior. He finds that there are two stages; one is the stage of reaction, and the other the stage of action. He contends that the second stage allows for a kind of rational explanation in terms of purposes. This kind of explanation of human behavior will be discussed more thoroughly later.

B. Psychoanalytic Theory

While behavioristic theories put their emphasis on the influence of the environment on behavior, psychoanalytic theory finds another strong determinant of human behavior. The basic notion of psychoanalysis is that underlying all conscious thought and action are unconscious processes. The ‘unconscious’ has been defined as any mental process the existence of which we are obliged to assume. According to Freud,\textsuperscript{61} we infer the unconscious from its effects, but we are not directly aware of it. Some examples of which, can be seen in hypnosis and slips of the tongue. Freud further distinguishes two kinds of unconscious mental events. The first kind is, while unconscious, relatively and easily transformed into consciousness. He calls it ‘pre-conscious.’ The second kind, which is the basic concept of his ‘unconscious,’ refers to the mental events which, only with great difficulty, can be transformed into


Freud pictures the mind, therefore, as a kind of three-storey building: the top floor is the conscious, the second floor is the pre-conscious, and the ground floor is the unconscious. Later, however, he introduces concepts that are less suggestive of particular regions of the mind. These are the concepts of the id, ego, and super-ego. The id refers to the unconscious aspects of mental life, which represents the primitive or instinctive demands in man’s nature. The id is said to be ruled by the ‘pleasure principle,’ which is predominant in childhood. The ego, on the other hand, is the modification within the id. It acts as a restrainer of the demands of the id to accommodate it with the external reality. Finally, the super-ego is the part that internalizes attitudes of the parents. It serves as a modification of the ego when the ego is too weak to confront the problems and demands of the id and/or external reality.

Thus, according to this view, the unconscious plays a very important role in human behavior. It is sometimes claimed that the unconscious is a more powerful determinant in a person’s life than his conscious attitude, will, and intention. Jung refers to the unconscious as a living psychic entity which is relatively autonomous, behaving as if it were a personality with intentions of its own. He points out that its biological function is not just a mechanical one, in the sense that it is merely complementary to consciousness. It has the character of compensation, that is, an intelligent choice of means aiming not only at the restoration of the psychic equilibrium, but at the advance towards wholeness. “The reaction of the

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unconscious,” Jung writes, “is far from being merely passive; it takes the initiative in a creative way, and sometimes its purposive activity predominates over its customary reactivity.” Sinnott also explains that in the unconscious, choices are being made and ideas fitted together into patterns.\textsuperscript{64}

The nature of the unconscious, however, is far from being clear. The terms ‘unconscious,’ ‘subconscious,’ and, ‘Supraconscious’ are often used interchangeably. They sometimes form what are currently known as psychic phenomena. Aside from hypnotism, Germain\textsuperscript{65} also cites some other examples of the power of the Supraconscious including those in clairvoyance, autosuggestion, telepathy, and teleaudience. But as to the question of the validity of this psychic power, I think, a lot of work and evidence are still needed.\textsuperscript{66}

Like behavioristic theories, psychoanalytic theory has faced some criticisms, especially in relation to the justification of its criteria of interpretation. Farrell\textsuperscript{67} argues that there is no sufficient fact to give us reasonable assurance that an interpretation is true, since during the course of analysis the analyst makes several interpretations of the patient’s problems. A question may be raised concerning the relation between the analyst and the patient whether or not this relation opens the door to suggestion and suggestibility, that is, the patient is liable to accept the interpretations as being true of him. As a result, Farrell thinks that the analyst's


hypothesis is simply instrumental, rather than declaratory, which serves to bring about changes in the patient. Asher Moore also considers psychoanalysis as an interpretation of art, rather than an ‘induction.’ He says that incompatible diagnoses seem to be equally successful in practice.  

This problem seems to be recognized by Freud himself. As he writes:

> For psychoanalysis is not an impartial scientific investigation, but a therapeutic measure. Its essence is not to prove anything, but merely to alter something. In psychoanalysis the physician always gives his patient...the conscious anticipatory image by the help of which he is put in a position to recognize and to grasp the unconscious material.

Freud himself does not object the explanation of human behavior in teleological or purposive terms. In fact, he ascribes a ‘will’ to his patients. Freud holds that the individual determines his own fate, either through unconscious motives and goals, or through conscious insight and understanding.

In this connection, a question may be asked as to how the conscious is related to the unconscious. How do they affect each other? Which is more powerful in determining a person's behavior? Maltz explains that conscious thinking is the ‘control knob’ of the unconscious. The ‘unconscious machine,’ as he calls it, develops its reaction patterns from what has been fed to it by the conscious thought. Thus, the automatic reaction patterns of the unconscious can be changed by the conscious rational thought. The power of the conscious thought over the unconscious

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69 Quoted by B. A. Farrell, op. cit., p. 33.

70 See Joseph F. Rychlak, op. cit., p. 128.

is also implied in Royce's writing, in which he discusses in detail how a person can control his actions, ideas, emotion, and habits. Cammer also explains how a person, who is obsessed by some thoughts, urges, or actions, can free himself from these internal compulsion. Not only neurotics and psychotics, but sometimes those who have been brainwashed can set themselves free. The power of the conscious thinking can play, therefore, a more important role in human behavior. This is why Schmidt declares that “men are and become that which they think, feel, will, affirm and believe.” A peculiar thing about man is that if he believes something will happen, he will tend to behave accordingly. This is sometimes called ‘self-fulfilling prophecies.’ As Kurtz puts it, “The wish becomes the father to the fact, the idea to the act.”

C. Cognitive Theories

In the preceding discussion we have seen that the explanation of human behavior has shifted from external determinism, the environment, to internal determinism, the unconscious. But another internal factor, which we briefly discussed in the last part of the previous section, is the conscious thinking. This factor, to my understanding, seems to be the most influential determinant in human behavior. It is the conscious thinking that alters the environment and determines the course of the unconscious. The conscious thinking, or more particularly the processes of perception and perceptual organization, has been a major concern of cognitive theories, which begin with Gestalt theory.

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74 See J. A. C. Brown, op. cit., pp. 267-293.


76 Paul W. Kurtz, Decision and the Condition of Man, op. cit., p. 95.

of Gestalt theory more comprehensive and highly elaborate cognitive theories have developed.

The essential characteristic of cognitive theories, as pointed out by McDavid-Harari, is their emphasis on the process of cognition in gaining information and understanding of the world. According to Gestalt theory, it is assumed that human experience tends toward ‘good form’ (a translation of the German word ‘Gestalt’). The ‘good form’ operates somewhat in the manner of the dynamic movement toward increased order. That is, the individual will seek to order his experience, to have it make sense, and to experience the world as balanced, symmetrical, structured, and organized. Thus, in Gestalt therapy a great deal of emphasis is put on how the individual comes into contact with the environment, how he can increase his awareness, and how he can modify a situation. The conscious experience is, therefore, the most essential aspect of human psychological activity.

It should be noted that cognitive theories do not deny the unconscious factors, but only minimize their important influences as determinants of behavior. At the same time, they do recognize the importance of the environment or the external stimuli, but only insofar as the first-person point of view is concerned. This is based on the fact that experience is private to each individual. As to the influence of social and cultural elements, Gestalt theory does not directly call attention to them, but Lewinian field theory does put a very explicit emphasis of the significance of these elements in behavior. Parts of the explanation of human behavior in terms of cognition will be incorporated in the next section.

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III. Behavior and Explanation

As mentioned by Aristotle long time ago, man is a rational animal. Man possesses a faculty called ‘mind.’ The history of mind speculation has begun ever since the primitive time, but its complete nature remains unclear. It has been speculated as substance by some ancient philosophers, as process by the idealists, as relation by the realists, as intentional act by the new realists, as substantive by the critical realists, and as function by the pragmatists. Many contemporary thinkers, especially the materialists, tend to regard mind as identical with brain processes.

The problem that we are facing does not directly concern the nature of mind as much as the relation between mind and body. Two approaches to the problem of mind-body relation are discussed by Vesey. One is the so-called the Causal Approach and the other is the Non-Causal Approach. The former finds its basis in Humean causality, according to which it is a mistake to expect to understand how one event causes another, even if both events are physical or both mental. The latter approach, maintained by Vesey himself, contrasts Descartes' dualism in terms of the duality of subject and object in the unity of experience. It argues that the relation between subject and object is built-in. Which approach is right? The next section will probably shed some light on the problem of mind-body relation.

A. Motive and Cause

In this section we want to know how the conscious thinking moves a person to act or behave. We want to know what ‘causes’ a person to act and how the ‘cause’ relates to his action. In the first place we must distinguish between bodily movement and action.

81 See Charles W. Morris, op. cit.
Although they are so neatly related, they are not identical. Bodily movement and action have a one-many/many-one relationship, that is, one action may be performed by many movements of the body. Bodily movement may be explained in terms of physiological causation. But human action involves more than just physiological movements. As mentioned earlier, to understand human action or behavior, we must approach it from purposive explanation. In understanding human action, we are not so much concerned with ‘how’ a person does the action as with ‘why’ he does it. This distinction is what Rescher calls modality of action and rationale of action. Since human action presupposes rationality, it must be understood in teleological terms. A rational action must be explained in relation to the intended aims or goals. Such concepts as ‘motive,’ ‘intention,’ and ‘reason’ necessitate this understanding.

Unfortunately, most theories on human motivation are largely speculative and tentative. Since this is not a thesis on psychology, we will not go into detail on the nature of motivation. However, what does have a hearing on our topic is the relation between motive and action. Thus, we will not be so much concerned with how motivation originates as how it is related to action or behavior. The questions that we want to ask are: Does motive imply action? Does action presuppose motive? How are they connected? Does motive and action work in the same manner of causation as in physical determinism?

In trying to escape Humean causation, some thinkers have maintained that there is a necessary or logical connection between motive and action. Melden, for instance,

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argues that

if, then, the motive were some event either concurrent with or antecedent to the action of raising the arm, there would needs be a logically necessary connection between two distinct events—the alleged motive and the action, however it is described. This is impossible if the sequence motive-->action is a causal relation. It is equally impossible if the motive is some interior mental event distinct from that event that is the action of raising the arm.

“Stating the motive,” Melden continues, “is not offering a (Humean) causal explanation of the action. The explanation does not refer us to some other event—the motive—which explains causally how the action came to be.” This seeming logical connection between motive and action probably derives from the argument which states that all reasons for acting must ultimately rest on utilitarian foundations in terms of wants, or desires, or satisfactions. Thus, motive has been defined in terms of want, desire, interest, and inclination.

The question is, Must all reasons for acting ultimately rest on these utilitarian foundations? In his analysis of such a concept as ‘want’ Norman\textsuperscript{88} has shown that the argument is not always intelligible. He points out that the noun ‘want’ is not precisely the same as the noun-equivalent of the verb ‘to want.’ The noun ‘want’ refers to the objective needs rather than psychological attitudes and aspirations of the person. The term ‘wanting,’ on the other hand, is used in a more restricted sense. To say that one wants something, Norman argues, is to invite the question of ‘what for?’ The question can be answered in many different ways such as ‘it is delightful,’ ‘it is comfortable,’ ‘it is pleasant,’ ‘it is fun,’ ‘it suits me,’ ‘it befits me,’ and so on. Not all wants, therefore, are intrinsically rational or intelligible. Some wants can be given further reasons. A person may want something as such or he may want it for further reasons. A thing may be wanted as an end in itself, or as a means to an end. Further complication arises not only in the nature of want, but also in

relation to the owner of the want. The reasons for one’s action may be somebody else’s
wants. Not just any assertion of the form ‘I want just x,’ therefore, can provide an ultimate
reason-for-acting.

But even granted that some kind of ‘want’ can be inferred from an action, it still
does not follow that, given a ‘want,’ an action will always follow, For if we interpret
‘want’ in terms of objective needs like biological needs, not all such needs will result in
actions. For instance, Vitamin B is very necessary for life, but a person who lacks it does
not “behave in a goal-directed manner or in searching for it.” Moreover, a desire may occur
or emerge simultaneously with the consideration of the action. A person, says Hampshire, “now knows what he wants to do, because he has now formed his desire, and not because
he now knows how a pre-existing desire is properly to be characterized.” Thus, the alleged
logical connection between motive and action does not always hold when a certain motive
is given. People sometimes change their mind, forget to do what they have intended to, and
perhaps face a hindrance. The logical necessity will hold when there are no countervailing
factors. The difficulty in establishing this logical necessity partly arises from the fact that
the same action may be performed by different motives, and one motive may find outlets in
several different actions.

There is another form of argument for a logical connection which, I think, is
more plausible than that of Melden. This argument states that the logical connection lies
not between motive and action, but between the concept of desire and the concept of its
effect. This position does not commit one to conclude that the concept of effect of a desire

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89 Robert Thomson, op. cit., p. 151.


91 See A. Phillips Griffiths, “Acting with Reasons,” in Weakness of
Will, ed. Geoffrey Mortimore (Great Britain: Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, 1971),
pp. 177-189.
will always result in action. Therefore, motive and action are not logically connected.

The relation between motive and action will become clearer if we distinguish between ‘reasons’ for acting and ‘having reasons' for acting, or what Toulmin calls the ‘considerations’ in the light of which we act and the ‘weight’ these considerations carry. Giving reasons for acting can be expressed in different ways: first, giving reasons as justifying; second, giving reasons as signaling intentions; third, giving reasons as classifying or redescribing. Giving reasons in these senses are applications of procedures that we may have learned during our lifetime. But it is ‘having reasons’ for acting that leads to action. In this case reasons retain their rational character, of ‘having force for us’ rather than ‘forcing us,’ or ‘carrying weight with us’ rather than ‘overpowering us,’ or being ‘compelling’ rather than ‘compulsive.’

There are some other arguments that clearly show that psychological determinism does not work in the same manner as physical determinism, or that psychological laws cannot be analyzed in terms of physical laws. One of these arguments is developed by W. D. Ross in which he shows the incompatibility between psychological forces and physical forces. According to Ross, choice is a result of the strongest motive in which the weaker motives have no results whatsoever. Physical forces, however, have a resultant which is the compound result of all forces. Thus, in the case of conflict a person does not go partly to the class room and partly to the theater and end up somewhere in between. He either decides to go to the class room, or to the theater or both one after another. Ross says, “This, it seems to me, is the great difference between physical and mental causation, that in the latter there is no law of the composition of all the forces concerned, but some of the forces concerned are, by an act of choice, deprived of any effect on action.”


Another great difference is in the way in which ‘strongest forces’ and ‘strongest motives’ are detected and measured. Edwards points out that the ‘strongest forces’ must be measured by an ex post facto criterion, but the ‘strongest motive’ may be known in some instances far in advance of acting. We do not need the experimental criterion to tell us what desire is strongest. Again, Edwards reminds us that the strongest desire will prevail because it is strongest, but its being ‘strongest’ does not mean that it will prevail. Some strongest desire never results in publicly observable action at all. Edwards contends that if the likeness between motive-causes and force-causes were complete, there would be no need for an ‘act of choice.’ Choosing would be made superfluous.\(^95\)

Moreover, some thinkers have shown that sentences used in describing mental or psychological phenomena are logically distinct from sentences used in describing physical phenomena.\(^96\) One simple example may be seen in the concept of ‘can’ used in the contexts of inanimate things and in human beings. Richard Taylor\(^97\) distinguishes four senses of ‘can’ in the contexts of inanimate things. First, it is a logical sense as expressed in this statement: “A billiard ball can be both round and red.” Second, it is a causal sense as in the statement: “Atoms can swerve from their paths.” Third, it expresses an epistemic sense like “This can be the restaurant we ate in long ago.” Fourth, it is in the sense of a causal capacity, or hypothetical possibility. The statement, “This stone is so hot it can fry an egg,” conveys this sense. When used with human beings, however, ‘can’ embodies none of these senses or idea. Taylor says that his moving his finger and his finger moving are not the same. The first always entails, but never be entailed by, the latter. Thus, ‘can’ in the statement “can move my finger” does not mean what it ever means when applied to physical things. A person has power within him to move or not to move his finger.

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psychological concepts and physical concepts. He contends that psychological phenomena do not constitute a closed system, and are not amenable to precise prediction or subsumption under deterministic laws. Hampshire arrives at a similar conclusion when he says: “There are too many different levels of rationality and deliberateness in conduct, too many varieties of half-intentional action and half-conscious thought, for any tidy formula to fit it. There is no possibility of devising a simple machinery of the mind in terms of which to explain the indefinite varieties of human conduct.” This leads us to the next question on the prediction of human behavior. If there is no sharp and law-like connection between psychological concepts and physical concepts, if psychological laws cannot be put in a tidy formula, how much can we predict about human behavior?

B. Behavior and Prediction

Interestingly enough, contemporary psychology has turned to mathematics in the test of its findings. Much of psychological experimentation and observation have already been reduced to quantitative form because quantitative relationships are usually easier to test than a qualitative distinction in the laboratory. As a result, mathematical theories in psychology have been formulated. One common theoretical pattern or ‘model’ of behavior is known as SEU (‘subjectively expected utility’). According to this model, people either explicitly or implicitly wish to achieve that goal which seems to them subjectively the most appealing and most likely to materialize. It is said that any theory of rationality which does not incorporate the concept of utility or subjective value of outcomes is vulnerable to difficulties in interpretation of behavior. The SEU theory is built on two assumptions:


first, it is assumed that although decisions vary in content, importance, and social context, the abstract principles guiding behavior are basically the same; second, it is assumed that a person makes his decision in a manner which will maximize his expected utility. However, questions can be raised on how mathematical figures can deal with subjective values. How can we accurately predict a subjective value that is not what a person objectively gains or loses, but what he considers to be the value to him of what he gains or loses?

There are at least two things to be considered in the prediction of human behavior: one is the situation in which choice is made and the other is the past history of the subject. Restle himself acknowledges some difficulties in making such a prediction. The first difficulty deals with the perceptual situation. “Within just the perceptual situation,” says Restle, “neither the things perceived nor the responses which result from perception can be stated at all, for only the perceptual and not the objective term of the relationship is in hand.” Every situation becomes distinct from every other situation. On the problem of the subject’s past history, Restle notes that to interpret the past history is difficult if events in the past are not identical with the present case. Even when the person’s motivation is known errors may be committed in prediction because his technique for satisfying his motives is not known, or because his skill or vigor is wrongly estimated. Restle points out that the logic of behavior prediction is simple if the choice is merely between something the person likes and something he dislikes. But doubts can arise when the choice is more difficult, when the difference between what the person likes and dislikes is relatively slight, when alternatives offered are complex, or when the person chooses without being certain as to the outcome he will receive.

In this connection, Cohen examines two types of uncertainty: (1) when faced with different amounts of evidence which are equally balanced, and (2) when confronted with a larger mass of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and a smaller mass of uncontradicted

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evidence, on the other. A case in point, presented in details by Cohen, is a gambling situation in which a person chooses between two lotteries whose chance of winning is exactly the same, though the total number of chances is greater in one than in the other. In such a case how can we predict his choice? This question leads Cohen to discuss the pathology of decision-making in uncertainty. He shows that the inability to make decisions is a common phenomenon. However, Cohen goes as far as to say, which I do not totally agree with, that “in principle, every choice or decision that is made, every preference that is expressed, every conclusion arrived at or inference made, every generalization attempted, and every opinion uttered, is subject to some measure of uncertainty....” This uncertainty, Cohen maintains, may be due to the world outside us or it may be generated within, from personal experience and reflection. I agree with Cohen that certainty involves degrees of both objective and subjective elements. The question is, Who has the standard measurement to tell when we reach certainty, or at what point we are in uncertainty? To say that every choice that is made is subject to some measure of uncertainty is to make a rather uncertain generalization. A position that is more tenable would be, not that all choices are uncertain, but that not all choices are certain, which implies that some choices are uncertain.

There are some reasons why the prediction of human behavior will not always be certain. In the first place human social behavior is affected by an enormous number of variables. One of these variables involves values or morals. According to Dewey, moral have to do with all activity into which alternative possibilities enter. For whenever they enter a difference between better and worse arises. Second, a complete prediction is not possible because people are flexible and creative. A statistical analysis in one survey of behavior shows that the subjects are very inconsistent and behave very differently in different relationships. This is why Weiss says that “predictions refer to what is abstract, general, possible, whereas what happens is specific, concrete, the product of unduplicable, definite, temporal activities, creatively

104 John Cohen, op. cit., p. 158.


realizing, freshly filling out, making concrete what before was only possible.”\textsuperscript{107} Besides, if the theory of evolution is true, then, we can hardly predict the emergents or the new types of individuals that evolve from time to time.\textsuperscript{108} Third, human behavior tends to be affected by the prediction itself. A prediction when known to the subject will greatly affect his behavior. Swingle writes: “Much data now available demonstrate quite conclusively that data derived from self-report frequently are at variance with the subject's actual behavior.” Thus, he warns that when the independent variable is not directly manipulated one must be extremely cautious in making causal statements.\textsuperscript{109}

Though certainty cannot be reached in the prediction of human behavior, we do not say that social scientists may not predict human behavior at all. We only maintain that the most statistical laws can do is to foretell the chance or probability and not certainty.\textsuperscript{110} The prediction of human behavior will only be in general terms. It will not predict the exact time, place, and specific actions, because the prediction is formulated from only finite number of variables. But the infinite variety of a human being and a human situation cannot be condensed into a finite list of characteristics.\textsuperscript{111} Thus, unless all the underlying attitudes, including motivation, biological core, perceptual and cognitive style, cultural background, stimulus value, individual differences which affect a person’s behavior,\textsuperscript{112} and the rest of all situational conditions are known, the prediction of behavior will never become certain.


\textsuperscript{108} See David L. Miller, op. cit., pp. 63-65.


What can be summarized from our examination of human behavior? We have seen that human behavior is so complex; it cannot be explained or put into a single, tidy formula or theory. This is why Bowes concludes that a full understanding of how man behaves requires us to approach the question from different points of view, none of which can claim to possess the sole truth about man. Man is a multidimensional being and he is capable of functioning in many different modes. Each of the models examined earlier (behavioristic, psychoanalytic, and cognitive theories) alone is not adequate. Man is a synthesis of all three. This is why McDavid-Harari applies an eclectic approach which uses particular theories or models for the analysis of the particular aspects of human behavior for which they are best suited. A synthetic theory is also developed by Miller-Galanter-Pribram, who argues that a proper description of behavior must be made on all levels simultaneously. They maintain that behavior is organized simultaneously at several levels of complexity, which they call it ‘hierarchical organization of behavior.’

We must, therefore, approach human behavior from ‘coductionism,’ rather than from ‘reductionism.’ In coductionism we bring to bear a number of supplemental hypotheses. We do not reduce to one explanatory principle, law, or theory, but rather to sets of correlative principles, since there are many factors that will explain the given event, and many levels of interpretation. Coductionism is being used in the sciences of man. At least twenty specialized sciences, disciplines, and specialties have been developed to deal with various aspects of human behavior. They include psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, history, jurisprudence, linguistics, archeology, psychoanalysis, education, demography, communication theory, management science, systems engineering, operation research, decision making, game theory, semantics, general system theory, cybernetics. We must not be contented, therefore, with any single theory or discipline that claims to give a complete account of human behavior.

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114 John W. McDavid and Herbert Harari, op. cit.


116 See Paul W. Kurtz, Decision and the Condition of Man, op. cit., pp. 67, 70.
IV. The Concept of Choice

Having examined man’s general behavior, we are now ready to look deeper into one aspect of man's activities, namely, his act of choice. From the preceding discussion we have seen that mechanistic determinism does not hold with man. Man is a rational being. He reflects on the past as well as on the future. He is flexible and creative. His behavior must be explained in teleological terms. The concept of purposive behavior presupposes that man has the ability to think, to decide, to choose, and to act. To understand the concept of choice, we will begin with the nature of thinking, since choosing is a kind of thinking.

A. Thinking

Thinking is a very complex process. The term 'thinking' itself has been used in many different senses. Thomson has enumerated six uses of the term; first, it is referred to what psychologists label as ‘autistic thinking such as fantasies, day-dreaming, the idle flitting from one half-formed notion to another; second, it is synonymous with ‘remembering’ like recalling; third, it is an imaginative thinking which is distinguished from fantasy; fourth, it is paying attention to the execution of a practical task; fifth, it is ‘believing’; sixth, it is ‘reasoning, ‘reflecting,’ or ‘pondering.’117 ‘Reasoning’ (thinking) may be further differentiated into mathematical thinking, logical thinking, and lateral thinking.118 But perhaps all these can be classified into two major kinds of thinking; first, the reality-adjusted or R-thinking which is logical, rational, and checked against external information; and, second, the autistic or A-thinking which is non-rational and independent of external correction.119

In recent development thinking process has been made analogous to that of a computer in its information-processing. Gagne has proposed roughly seven stages in the ‘internal activity’ of problem solving: “the statement of the problem; the recall of related facts and rules; the selection of relevant from irrelevant data; the combination, or organization, of relevant data in a new way; the production of a provisional solution; its verification; and, finally, its statement of

118 See Edward de Bono, op. cit.
acceptance.\textsuperscript{120} There are, however, some criticisms raised against using computers in the analysis of human thinking. In the first place there are fundamental differences in the two systems. For instance, in a nerve circuit two single impulses starting at opposite ends of a ‘wire’ will cancel each other out. But it is different from what happens with computer electricity. The differences would be too great to call the two processes by the same name. On a functional level computers find pattern recognition, such as the recognition of a hand-written letter of the alphabet, very difficult, but complicated sequences of mathematical operations very easy. The brain system, on the other hand, does the reverse. Moreover, computers are said to have dull and exact memories, while the brain system has a rather poor memory. Thus, computers are too efficient and too logical to compare with the brain. Besides, they are not affected by subjective elements. They do not display boredom, fatigue, or emotion. Laughter and creativity belong only to the brain system.\textsuperscript{121} These fundamental differences must be noted in order to guard against making human thinking which includes the act of choice on the same level with that of computers.

B. Choosing

It seems that most of our choosing acts belong to the kind of reflective thinking.\textsuperscript{122} As implied by Thomson, there are some familiar kind of activity going on in the reflective thinking such as calculating, comparing alternative hypotheses and applying various operation in relation to them, asking questions, giving answers, discriminating discrepancies, etc.\textsuperscript{123} Gripaldo also considers choosing as involving reflective thinking. He distinguishes three stages of the act of choosing: “(1) the agent’s act of recognizing before deliberation of the alternatives, (2) the agent's acts of deliberating and deciding, and (3) the agent’s act of taking, buying, etc.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 441.

\textsuperscript{121} See Edward de Bono, op. cit., pp. 21-22; and D. S. Wright et al, op. cit., pp. 442-443.

\textsuperscript{122} Earlier, we find that some writers talk about choice in the unconscious thinking. Edward de Bono also speaks of primary selection, preference, and choice in the stage of perception where a person obtains the concepts of disappearance, destruction, creation, conversion, and alteration, depending on what attention picks out. See Edward de Bono, op. cit., pp. 89-96.

\textsuperscript{123} Robert Thomson, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
One of the problems in the act of choosing has to do with the concept of ‘alternative.’ It is commonly accepted that choice implies more than one alternative. "Choice, by definition," says Farrar, "lies between alternatives." The problem is, If there is more than one alternative, is each alternative possible? Must it be one and only fitting alternative in every choosing situation? Different viewpoints on the notion of choice will depend on the answer to this question.

In denying the notion of choice as illusory, Gripaldo maintains that there is only one alternative fitting or appropriate in every choosing situation. He thinks that the notion of choice is meaningful only in the initial stage, that is, the stage of recognizing alternatives. But when the agent is engaged in deliberation there is no more choice between the alternatives because "there is but one and only one alternative that fits the choosing situation." This assumption, I believe, is carried over from Gripaldo's insistence on a 'rational choice.' There seems to be a failure to distinguish between what is actual and what the agent thinks is actual. Thus, Gripaldo would not accept G. E. Moore’s remark that it is possible for a person to choose any of the different alternatives since he may not know for certain beforehand, which choice he actually will take.

Williams has also pointed out that there are degrees of certainty, about future actions, both in prediction and in intention and decision. Gripaldo insists, however, that deliberation is essential to choice. He would not accept indeliberate choices as choices at all. But again we are facing with the notion of deliberation. Does deliberation imply that the agent will know all the relevant data concerned? Will every deliberation lead the agent to choose the

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124 Rolando M. Gripaldo, Circumstantialism (Dumaguete City: Silliman University Press, 1977), p. 16

125 'Choice' is sometimes used interchangeably with 'decision,' though it is more restricted. See Harold Ofstad, op. cit., p. 16 and Rolando M. Gripaldo, op. cit., pp. 35-41.


one and only fitting alternative? Gripaldo’s demand seems to put man on the same level with computers. But, as pointed out earlier, ‘computer thinking’ is too efficient and too logical to compare with human thinking.

In the light of our daily experience we find that people do not always choose the best or most fitting alternative in every choosing situation. People sometimes make wrong choices, change their minds, and at times become indecisive. Sometimes the sense of regret, remorse, and anxiety after a choice has been made shows that people make wrong choices or do not know for certain whether the choice suits them best. It shows that they wished they should have chosen otherwise. This post-decision experience has been proven in some psychological research. It has been found that there is a temporary period in which the person experiences regret immediately following a decision made between two approximately equally attractive alternatives. The chosen alternative becomes less attractive and the rejected alternative more attractive than it had been before the decision. Choice may become stressful for a person either because of the costliness of error or similarity of the alternatives. Berlin declares that where there is no choice there is no anxiety. Though the statement needs some qualification; there is some truth in it.

Because of his assumption, Gripaldo is led to conceive of choosing in terms of ‘compulsion.’ He writes: “If there is only one alternative that fits the choosing situation, then one is forced or compelled to choose it, for there is no other if he were to make a choice. This subtle kind of compulsion is simply ignored by those who believe in a free choosing agent.” Gripaldo uses the term ‘compulsion’ in the sense of being ‘forced upon,’ ‘dictated upon,’ or ‘pressured upon’ the agent by the choosing situation. This ‘compulsion’ is perhaps true if and

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131 Quoted by Corliss Lamont, op. cit., p. 28.

only if there were only one alternative and the agent must choose it. But we question if it is true that there is one and only one alternative in every choosing situation and whether people feel ‘compelled’ in making choices.

Granted that the agent knows all the relevant data in a choosing situation, it still does not follow that there must be only one alternative to be chosen in every choosing situation. Though people generally choose one of the two alternatives, it does not follow that they never choose both or neither. When offered sugar or milk, a person may choose both, though he may not choose both coffee and tea at the same time as Gripaldo contends. Thus, in the case where there are many alternatives and there is no rule saying that they have to choose only one, people may choose more than one alternative, especially when they like the alternatives. If in every choosing situation there is one and only alternative, then the concepts of ‘either or,’ ‘neither,’ ‘both,’ and, ‘all’ would become meaningless in a choosing situation. Ultimately, the concept of alternative must be considered in relation to, not only the choosing situation, but also the purpose, aim, or goal of the decision or choice. As pointed out earlier, the concept of motive could be very complex. A person may choose, therefore, more than one alternative if the choice will suit his motive and the choosing situation.

The concept of alternative becomes more complex when we consider choice in relation to trying and doing. In this connection, I hope to map out some of these alternatives. But, first, some distinctions must be made between:

1. The ability to choose—(I can choose x)
2. The choice itself--(I choose x)
3. The ability to try—(I can try x)
4. The attempt itself—(I try x)
5. The ability to do or act—(I can do x)
6. The act itself--(I do x)

From these distinctions we may derive the following alternatives:

1. I can choose x may or may not imply that I (will) choose x.
2. I choose x presupposes that I can choose x.
3. I can try x may or may not imply that I (will) try x.
4. I try x presupposes that I can try x.
5. I can do x may or may not imply that I (will) do x.
6. I do x presupposes that I can do x.
7. I can choose x and/or (actually) choose x may or may not imply that I can try x and/or (actually) try x.
8. I can try x and/or (actually) try x. presupposes that I can choose x.
9. I can try x and/or (actually) try x may or may not presuppose that I choose x.
10. I can choose x and/or (actually) choose x may or may not imply that I can do x and/or (actually) do x.
11. I can do x and/or (actually) do x presupposes that I can choose x.
12. I can do x and/or (actually) do x may or may not presuppose that I choose x.
13. I can try x and/or (actually) try x -may or may not imply that I can do x and/or (actually) do x.
14. I can do x and/or (actually) do x presupposes that I can try x and/or (actually) try x.

I disagree with von Wright who holds that a person can try something only when he can do it. Logically, however, von Wright is right in that a person cannot try to do something what he in fact cannot do. But it is also true that a person may not know beforehand whether he can do something or not unless he first tries it. A person may be able to do many things after he has tried them, and perhaps after several attempts. Thus, trying x may or may not imply doing x and/or being able to do x. Once a person can do x, to say that he may try to do x does not seem to make much sense in ordinary language.

C. Doing Otherwise

We have demonstrated that genuine, possible alternatives need not be one and only one in every choosing situation. The next problem is, Could a person have chosen the alternative that was not chosen, or could a person have chosen otherwise? The question that is often asked is, “Could a person have done otherwise?” However, the question itself contains some ambiguity. In the first place, the term ‘done’ does not clearly say whether a person could have chosen or acted otherwise.

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From our chart above we find that choosing may or may not imply doing or acting. Thus, a person could have chosen otherwise without acting otherwise. A person, for instance, who is forced to do something which he does not choose to or against his will, will most likely choose otherwise, though he may not act otherwise. It seems, therefore, that choosing or deciding may be situation free in the sense that it is merely a mental activity which may or may not result in action.

The second problem contained in the question, “Could a person have done ‘otherwise’?” concerns with the concept of ‘otherwise.’ What does it really mean by ‘otherwise’? Take, for example, a case of murder. What do we mean when we ask, “Could the murderer have done otherwise?” It seems that we refer to a contrary action, rather than the same or different action. For certain, we do not mean that the murderer could have committed the murder in a different manner, nor do we mean that he could have done another different action while committing the murder. We simply want to know whether the murderer could have refrained from committing the murder. On the other hand, ‘otherwise’ can mean the same action but done in a different manner. For instance, a person raced in a one-hundred-yard dash in ten seconds. The following day he said that he could have done otherwise if so and so were the case. Here we would take him to mean that he could have run faster the other day. ‘Otherwise’ here refers to the same kind of action but done in a different manner. Thus, the meaning of ‘otherwise’ as defined by Lehrer as “doing something what the person did not do” could be very misleading. For it could mean several things, such as doing the same thing in a different manner, or doing another thing which is different, or doing an opposite thing of what was done before.

The third problem has to do with the distinction between decision and choice. When we

134 See also the example given by Francis V. Raab in Rolando M. Gripaldo's *Circumstantialism*, op. cit., pp. 89-93.

ask; “Could a person have done otherwise?” do we always assume that he was confronted with a choice? Since not all actions imply choice between alternatives, a person may decide to do something without thinking of doing otherwise. In such a case to ask if he could have done otherwise would be absurd. Unless we know that the person was confronted with a choice between alternatives, we should not ask whether he could have done otherwise. Choice presupposes decision; but decision may not imply choice.

Granted the preceding linguistic problems can be solved, we still face with an empirical problem of whether a person could have really done otherwise. Gripaldo, who is so concerned with situational conditions, denies that a person could have done otherwise. Again, it is attributed to his assumption as he writes: “Since in a choosing situation the person is forced, albeit subtly, to choose his choice, for there is no other suitable alternative to it, it is very unlikely that he could have chosen differently.”\(^\text{136}\) He maintains that “every choosing situation is unique unto itself in terms of the agent's temporal, physical, mental, and environmental states.”\(^\text{137}\) As a result, he concludes that there is but one and only one fitting alternative in a choosing situation.

I agree with Gripaldo that every choosing situation is unique unto itself. In terms of a temporal scale alone every situation is never exactly the same as others. But the uniqueness of a situation does not mean that there must be one and only fitting alternative, nor does it mean that in a different choosing situation the ‘same’ alternative may never be taken. How could we account for the fact that people sometimes choose the ‘same’ alternative over and over again? It seems that a demand for absolute situational conditions is rather unnecessary as far as choice is concerned. Perhaps more or less similar situational conditions can be arranged and manipulated in order to test whether a person could have done otherwise. Thus, whether or not a person could have done otherwise is an empirical matter. The answer to this problem plays an important role in solving the dispute between determinism and freedom. For freedom of choice implies that a person could have chosen and/or acted otherwise.

\(^{136}\) Rolando M. Gripaldo, op. cit., p. 97.

\(^{137}\) Ibid., p. 100.
D. Free Choice

In this section we will show that a person could have chosen otherwise and that freedom of choice is possible. One method of showing that a person could have chosen otherwise is to show that the range of alternatives is of equal probability of being chosen. Lehrer, in his article “An Empirical Disproof of Determinism,” takes a simple action of arm lifting. Having laid down some necessary conditions, he shows that the range of alternatives between lifting and not lifting the arm is of equal probability, and that the person could have done otherwise. It has been counter-argued, however, that the actions of lifting or not lifting one’s arm are determined by his past conditioning and his state of mind, e.g., his motive of doing the action. Thus, Lehrer himself admits that this empirical evidence showing that a person could have done otherwise does not imply the falsity of determinism.

Professor Acuna, in his model for freedom of choice, also lays down some conditions in order to obtain the range of alternatives that is of equal probability of being chosen. The first condition stipulates that the range of alternatives is novel, or that the agent encounters for the first time in his life. According to this condition, not only that the agent encounters the range of alternatives for the first time, but also that the range of possible responses is outside the agent’s history of conditioning. It demands that no variables are present in his history of conditioning. The second condition, however, accepts the presence of some kind of controlling variables, only that these variables divide themselves equally among the range of alternatives Professor Acuna contends that freedom of choice under the second condition can be demonstrated empirically. A person can be conditioned to respond equally to a set of alternatives so that it would be very difficult to predict which response will be emitted.

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I think the second condition of Professor Acuna faces the same problem faced by Lehrer’s example. That is, any of the responses, no matter how equal, is still a part of conditioning since the agent has been conditioned to respond in such a manner. Professor Acuna’s first condition seems to be more plausible in that it escapes the problem faced by the second condition. It requires the absence of variables in the agent's history of conditioning. The problem with this condition, however, is how to empirically show the absence of any variable. For certain, we cannot assume the absence of all variables since a person is born with some genetic endowments and into a certain environment. It would be very difficult, therefore, to show and maintain that those variables present in a choosing situation are novel, or that they are not related to other variables at all.

I would like to present another case for freedom of choice. This case does not require that the range of alternatives is novel or of equal probability of being chosen. It does require, however, that the more probable alternative is not compelling and that the less probable alternative is within the power of the individual. I will take the case of stopping the arms from swinging while walking. As we know, people naturally and sometimes unconsciously swing their arms while walking to keep their physical balance. We will take this action of arm swinging while walking as a more probable alternative course of action since it has been done unconsciously and habitually and the stopping of the arms from swinging while walking as a less probable alternative course of action. Thus, assuming that a person has normal, functional arms and the psychological and physical conditions render the swinging and stopping of his arms possible, we can show that for a short period of time, say, one or two minutes, he can stop his arms from swinging while walking. We will find that the person could have done otherwise through an act of choice.

Freedom of choice may occur, therefore, in any of these two cases: first, when the range of alternatives is of equal probability of being chosen; second, when the range of alternatives is not of equal probability, but the less probable alternative is still within the power of the choosing agent and the more probable alternative is not compelling. In fact, the power to choose is also implied in the first case, that is, when the range of alternatives is of equal probability of being chosen the agent can still choose; he does not become impotent. Freedom of choice must be
considered in relation to man’s natural power.

V. A Concept of Freedom

The term ‘freedom’ has been used in many different senses. We often hear people speak of political freedom, economic freedom, intellectual freedom, academic freedom, religious freedom, moral freedom, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, etc. Adler\textsuperscript{140} has classified freedom into three main categories: first, a circumstantial freedom of self-realization, including a special variant of political liberty, which is defined as “a freedom which is possessed by any individual who, under favorable circumstances, is able to act as he wishes for his own good as sees it;” second, an acquired freedom of self-perfection, including a special variant of collective freedom, defined as “a freedom which is possessed only by those men who, through acquired virtue or wisdom, are able to will or live as they ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature;” and, third, a natural freedom of self-determination defined as “a freedom which is possessed by all men, in virtue of a power inherent in human nature, whereby a man is able to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he shall do or shall become.” It can be seen that natural freedom of self-determination precedes all the others. Circumstantial freedom and acquired freedom presuppose natural freedom. Man first possesses a certain power by virtue of his very nature.

A. Natural freedom of Self-Determination

Earlier, we have found that the natural ability to choose, to try, and to act is inherent in man. This natural ability is what Weiss refers to as static freedom. It is the power, the ability, the capacity that objects have. It belongs to a being because of the nature and structure it has; and it may or may not be exercised.\textsuperscript{141} This kind of freedom has been referred to by philosophers down


\textsuperscript{141} See Paul Weiss, Man’s Freedom, op. cit., pp. 28-36.
Aristotle says that action is voluntary only if the moving principle is in man, that is, his power to do or not to do. Alexander of Aphrodisias defines ‘liberty’ as power to choose what to do after deliberation and consultation, and to choose and to do what is most eligible to our reason. Augustine writes about the power of the will. Anselm defines ‘freedom’ as the ability (the power) to preserve the rectitude of the will for its own sake. Locke says, “...the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind.” Hume also speaks of ‘liberty’ as “a power of acting or not acting, according to the determination of the will.” In their discussions on the concept of freedom Spinoza and Leibniz seem to imply the notion of man’s power as well. Voltaire is very clear on this point when he writes; “What is the meaning of this phrase to be free? It means ‘to be able,’ or else it has no meaning.” Freedom as power is also central in Kant’s philosophy. 

The extremist interpretation of this freedom comes from existentialism, especially the atheistic one. Nietzsche advocates the ‘Superman’ as a guiding principle of man.  

According to Sartre, “To be man means to reach toward being God.” However, Sartre does not directly define freedom in terms of power, but his philosophy implies power. He holds that freedom belongs equally to every man. “...For freedom is not a quality among other qualities—it is evident that every man is a freedom.” Human freedom precedes his essence. Man exists first and later defines himself. Because there is no God, Sartre maintains, man is free. Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. “Each person is an absolute choice of self from the standpoint of a world of knowledge and of techniques which this choice both assumes and illumines.”

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Man, according to Sartre, is condemned to be free. This kind of freedom is also implied by Rogers and Stevens who say that it is “an inner something which exists in the living person.... It is the freedom to choose one’s own attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way. It is an inner, subjective, and existential kind of freedom. It is something which exists within the individual, something phenomenological rather than objective.”

It is not my intention to critique existentialism at this point. I merely refer to it in support of the thesis that man does possess certain power. It is the power that a person possesses in determining whether to do this or that. Muller conceives of it as a power of conscious choice between significant, known alternatives. It is this power to choose that underlies the concept of human rights. Freedom as power is often expressed as ‘freedom to.’ “Freedom to,” says Weiss, “is the power to act either inwardly as a being of intent or outwardly as one who can publicly express his wishes and carry out his obligations.” ‘Freedom to’ precedes ‘freedom from.’ While Skinner stresses freedom from undesirable events, Carpenter maintains that thinking activity can lead to freedom to--to do things that were formerly impossible.

Man possesses both physical and mental power. To a certain extent, he exercises power over the environment. He is not totally controlled by his environment. As a matter of fact, the program of social control, as envisioned by Skinner himself, rests on man’s power over the

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149 See Corliss Lamont, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
environment. Skinner does not call for a direct control of human behavior; he envisions, instead, for a control of the environment which will in turn control human behavior. The question is, How can man in the first place control the environment if he has no power over it? Certainly, man is not totally free from his environment either, but he is free to the extent that through his power he can use the environment to effect new orders. In the words of Lamont, “Man can transform a natural power that commands into a power that serves.”\textsuperscript{154} The Marxist clearly teaches about man’s power over the environment. Engels talks about freedom from Nature’s control. By ‘Nature’ he means the conditions of existence which form man’s environment. Man, says Engels, must gain his consciousness and control Nature. He must be the master of Nature and fashion his own history. This is what Engels calls “humanity’s leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.”\textsuperscript{155}

Man does not only have power over the environment, out also over himself. Self-determination forms the foundation of this freedom. Lamont interprets self-determination to mean that a man is acting as agent and not as passive subject matter for some other agent; he is the subjective source of his own behavior.\textsuperscript{156} The free man is master of himself and not subject to the will of others.\textsuperscript{157} Master of oneself means self-control. Part of this self-control is the mastering of reactions or attitudes toward a situation.\textsuperscript{158} It is this control from within which is the goal of transactional analysis\textsuperscript{159} that should lead to social control. As justified by London, “The

\textsuperscript{154} Corliss Lamont, op. cit., p. 49.


\textsuperscript{156} Corliss Lamont, op. cit., p. 134.

\textsuperscript{157} See Mortimer J. Adler, Great Ideas from the Great Books, op. cit., p. 289.


\textsuperscript{159} See Eric Berne, Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy (Castle Books, 1961), pp. 22-23.
ideology of awareness demands that social controls must ultimately be seated within the individual himself. formulated by Perry London, controls from without can lead to robotism. Fromm tells us that the problem in the twentieth century is that man is ‘dead.’ He says that man is confronted with a choice, not that between Capitalism and Communism, but that between robotism and Humanistic Communitarian Socialism. Thus, Fromm also advocates ‘freedom to’ - to be oneself, to be productive, to be fully awake.

B. Freedom and Awareness

Since freedom is related to man's ability or power and since not every man possesses the same amount of power, freedom varies, therefore, from person to person. I disagree with Sartre who maintains that freedom is not a quality. He seems to overlook the fact that not every man is born with the same natural ability. Men do not differ only in terms of intelligence, personality, and psychopathology, but also sometimes in terms of physiological makeup. Men, who have more ability or power both mental and physical, both natural and acquired, will certainly have more freedom. As a quality, freedom does not vary only in relation to physical and mental power, but also in relation to social, political, economic, and material power. This is why Mao thinks that the working class has no freedom from being exploited.

The question that we are facing, however, is how to increase one’s freedom. Since freedom is related to ability or power, we must concern therefore with how to increase this


162 See D. S. Wright et al, op. cit., p. 447.


power. I believe mental power, which is related to choice, is most fundamental of all powers. We must seek, therefore, mental power above all. As Mill\textsuperscript{165} has shown that intellectual pleasure and, if I may include, intellectual power are more desirable than physical pleasure and power. One important word that has been mentioned throughout the discussion is ‘awareness’ or ‘consciousness.’ Mental power comes with awareness. It increases one’s insight into the range of alternatives. An illustration may be drawn from language and expression. A person, who has learned only a small vocabulary, will certainly have a hard time in expressing himself. His freedom of expression will be limited. Thus, the more we know, the greater the relief from the burden of choice.\textsuperscript{166} The less we know, the less freedom we have in making choices. As Greenspan points out, when a person is unaware he is deprived of possible reason for doing otherwise.\textsuperscript{167} Our freedom of choice is not only limited by a lack of knowledge of possible alternatives, but also by a false belief in alternatives which we believe to be open to us which in fact are not.\textsuperscript{168}

What should we be aware of in order to attain and increase our freedom of choice? Kurtz tells us to be aware “(1) of the particular facts of the situation; (2) of the general causal conditions and laws; (3) of the means at our disposal and the consequences of our action; (4) of the existing de facto values involved, both individually and socially; and (5) of the basic needs of man.”\textsuperscript{169} In relation to the general causal conditions and laws, we should be aware of the forces behind the apparent wish, which means the discovery of unconscious desires.\textsuperscript{170} These

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\textsuperscript{167} P. S. Greenspan, op. cit., p. 240

\textsuperscript{168} See B. A. O. Williams, op. cit., p. 124.

\textsuperscript{169} Paul W. Kurtz, Decision and the Condition of Man, op. cit., p. 241

unconscious desires or motivations that underlie ‘games’ people play\textsuperscript{171} can be overcome through awareness. Moreover, we must be aware of the fact that awareness as such is not effective unless it is accompanied by the will to act, by the readiness to suffer the pain of frustration that necessarily results from an action contrary to our passions.\textsuperscript{172} We find this true in the writings of Freud and Marx.

“Both proposed that man is determined by the laws of cause and effect, but that by awareness and right action he can create and enlarge the realm of freedom. It is up to him to gain an optimum of freedom and to extricate himself from the chain of necessity. For Freud the awareness of the unconscious, for Marx the awareness of socio-economic forces and class interests were the conditions for liberation; for both in addition to awareness, an active will and struggle were necessary conditions for liberation.”\textsuperscript{173}

Bowart reminds us also that freedom is not free; it must be won.\textsuperscript{174} Why is awareness badly needed today? What is the state of man’s freedom? Russell tells us that human freedom can be obstructed by physical and social factors.\textsuperscript{175} Thus, we are back again to Skinner's thesis. The environment certainly shapes human behavior and thus affects his freedom. In one way or another, our social existence determines our consciousness.\textsuperscript{176} This is why Rogers maintains that man is a pawn of government, molded by mass propaganda, a product of his class.\textsuperscript{177} We also


\textsuperscript{172} Erich Fromm, The Heart of Man, op. cit., p. 170.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p. 161.

\textsuperscript{174} Walter Bowart, op. cit., p. 282.


find that institutions that man sets up turn out to be a threat to his freedom. Institutions can be just coercive on the individual as the exercise of power in the service of deliberate plan. A lot of decisions are no longer made by the individual, but by the organization. Moreover, the contemporary industrialized society tends to be totalitarian in the sense that needs are manipulated and superimposed by vested interests. Thus, in the present day the sanctity of the individual is being eroded from all sides. To such a threat which would engulf personality, Cohen calls for a resistance, which may be done “either by independent thinking, by a stubborn memory, by seeking access to unorthodox information or by general distrust of certain leaders... These are examples of resistance within the personality.”

If awareness is to enhance and enlarge one’s freedom, education must be the means. In his assertion of behavior control London maintains that society must eventually operate through the medium of education rather than coercion, of persuasion rather than law. It is sad to note, however, that the current trend in education is moving away from freedom. As pointed out by Rogers and Stevens, “There are tremendous pressures today—cultural and political—for conformity, docility, and rigidity.” He thinks that personal feeling, free choice, uniqueness, have


183 Christian Bay, op. cit., p. 343.

little place in the classroom.\textsuperscript{185} This is why Holt,\textsuperscript{186} in his discussion on children education, calls for more choice and less fear. As a result, Rogers and Stevens propose education whose teaching is student-centered and whose aims are to assist students to become individuals

\begin{quote}
“who are able to take self-initiated action and to be responsible for those actions;
who are capable of intelligent choice and self-direction;
who are critical learners, able to evaluate the, contributions made by others;
who have acquired knowledge relevant to the solution of problems;
who, even more importantly, are able to adapt flexibly and intelligently to new problem solutions;
who have internalized an adaptive mode of approach to problems, utilizing all pertinent experience freely and creatively;
who are able to cooperate effectively with others in these various activities;
who work, not for approval of others, but in terms of their own socialized purposes.”\textsuperscript{187}
\end{quote}

In short, students should be exposed to “the skills of sound criticism, evaluation, and identification of basic assumptions, discrimination between fact and opinion, identification of testable assertions, development of plausible problems, hypothesis-making, and the like.”\textsuperscript{188} The purpose of this kind of education is to develop what Postman and Weingartner\textsuperscript{189} call “a new kind of person, one who...is an actively inquiring, flexible, creative, innovative, tolerant, liberal personality who can face uncertainty and ambiguity without disorientation, who can formulate viable new meanings to meet changes in the environment which threaten individual and mutual survival.” Is this goal too idealistic? I do not think so. In fact, many courses in philosophy and social sciences are contributing toward this goal. We must bear in mind that a severe lack of the mentioned skills would impose certain limitations and constraints on freedom. Thus, if we are to defend and enhance human freedom, no goal should be too high to reach, no training should be too hard to pursue, and no price should be too great to pay.

\textsuperscript{185} Carl R. Rogers and Barry Stevens, \textit{Person to Person}, op. cit., p. 50.


\textsuperscript{187} Carl R. Rogers and Barry Stevens, \textit{Person to Person}, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

\textsuperscript{188} See Finley Carpenter, op. cit., pp. 145-149.

\textsuperscript{189} Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, \textit{Teaching As A Subversive Activity} (Penguin Books, 1972), p. 204
Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I would like to sum up the arguments that have been presented. I maintain that the dispute between determinism and freedom must be approached on a middle ground. As I see it, determinism and freedom do not have to be mutually exclusive. The two can be compatible in the sense that they can be true at the same time. The position that I have arrived at may be called freedom within determinism. I do not take freedom, therefore, as the absence of any determinants, but within the given determinants and under certain conditions.

Physical determinism has proven successful in spite of the fact that inductive reasoning will never become deductive or absolutely certain. It has been generally accepted that we will never reach absolute certainty in matters of fact. What we actually have are degrees of probability. Physical determinism, as demonstrated in the success of natural sciences, proves to be highly probable. But it should not be taken to mean that we have fully understood all that there is about the universe. As pointed out by Bridgman, the complexity of the universe is not yet fathomed and our intellectual capacity is rather limited. Thus, Munitz advises us not to commit ourselves in advance to the belief that nature has a structure that will yield its secrets to one and only one formulation. In some areas determinism remains to be proven. It does not mean, however, that determinism is false.

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As our examination moves on to social sciences, we find that psychological determinism is not as probable as physical determinism. Three contemporary psychological theories have been examined, namely, behavioristic, psychoanalytic, and cognitive theories. We find some weaknesses in the behavioristic theories. Skinner's operant behaviorism seems to put an exclusive emphasis on the influence of the environment on human behavior. There is no doubt that the environment influences a great deal of human behavior. A lot of our behavior is a product of our physical and social environment.

While conditioning holds true the chances of deviation are also possible. Man is a unique creature in that he interacts with his environment. The seeming paradox about man is that he can be conditioned by his environment and he can also condition his environment to suit his needs. Man is controlled and controls at the same time. It is rather too simplistic to conclude, therefore, that man is nothing but a mere product of his conditioning. The history of science has demonstrated how much man has exerted control over his environment and his fellowman. We have become huge by our technology.

“Our ears are huge: we can hear words spoken anywhere on earth, and beyond; we can hear voices and sounds from the past. Our eyes are great telescopes and tiny watchers among atoms: we can see the faces of dead men smile; we watch long-disappeared feats unfold again and again. Our hands are massive machines: we can kill a man at one hundred yards; we can crush a city at any distance; we can tickle minute microbes; we can fashion a hundred tiny circuits instantly.”

Because man is active and creative, he can shape his future. A lot of problems are potentially subject to his control.\textsuperscript{194} Through the principle of conditioning itself man can bring about many new changes both in the environment and in himself. The so-called ‘Behavior Modifiers’ have been able to change their behavior and life with the use of behavioristic principles.\textsuperscript{195}

Another form of psychological determinism comes in the form of psychoanalysis which maintains that underlying all conscious thought and action are unconscious processes. In other words, the unconscious is the determinant of human behavior. Again, this view seems to commit a fallacy of over generalization. While some actions of some people may be controlled by some unconscious motivations, it does not mean that all actions of all people are controlled by them. The given examples of the unconscious as in hypnosis, clairvoyance, autosuggestion, telepathy, and teleaudience seem to be rather exceptional cases because most of our actions do not work in this manner. Moreover, the aim of psychoanalysis itself implies that the unconscious can be brought under the control of the conscious, rational thinking. It has been further demonstrated that even some of the unconscious, involuntary responses like, the autonomic nervous system can be controlled by the individual.\textsuperscript{196}

Thus, the conscious thinking process has become the major concern of cognitive theories. It is the conscious, rational thinking that alters and changes

\textsuperscript{195} Philip J. Hilts, op. cit., pp. 173-197.
man's environment and determines the course of his unconscious thinking. According to cognitive theories, human experience tends toward ‘good form,’ that is, each individual will seek to order his experience. Here man is seen as an active agent who can learn to creatively adjust himself to the environment.

As a result, we find that human behavior is highly complex. Human behavior and action are more than just physical systems. Human action is not completely predictable. It requires an explanation in teleological terms. Thus, we attempted to examine motivation and causes of action. But limited by the nature of our topic, we instead concentrate on the relation between motivation and action. Here we clearly see that psychological determinism does not work in the same manner as physical determinism. Moreover, we find that psychological statements and concepts are logically distinct from physical statements and concepts. The two comprise different kinds of certainty in different kinds of what Wittgenstein calls language-game. Thus, we conclude that human behavior must be understood in terms of conduct rather than reduction. A synthetic approach is needed. Any single theory will not suffice in the understanding of human behavior.

From man's general behavior we move on to one specific action, namely, the act of choice. Most of man’s behavior is, in fact, related to decisions and choices. Here we examine the problem of alternatives and find that genuine, possible alternatives need not be one and only one in every choosing situation. Thus, we argue that a person could have done otherwise and that freedom of


choice is possible. Two conditions have been laid down to show that a person could have done otherwise. First, the range of alternatives must be of equal probability of being chosen. Second, when the range of alternatives is not of equal probability, the more probable alternative must not be compelling and the less probable alternative must be within the power of the individual. In other words, there is no compulsion that will predispose the person to choose one rather than another even when the range of alternatives is not of equal probability. Thus, freedom is considered in relation to man's natural ability or power.

Since freedom is fundamentally related to ability or power, we bring in the concept of awareness which serves as a tool of increasing one’s knowledge and insight into the range of alternatives and other related factors in a choosing situation. Thus, the more a person is aware of his past conditioning, his unconscious motivation, the range of possible alternatives, and possible consequences of his action, the easier he can attain freedom of choice. In other words, he will not be easily compelled by any single variable to make him choose one alternative rather than another; he will have a greater possibility of doing otherwise. Finally, we discuss the kind of education that will help enlarging one's awareness and the possibility of freedom.

The discussion has shown that the future of man largely depends on the choices that he makes now. A person who does not make his own choice or decision will eventually become a product of his environment and circumstances. Freedom to think, to feel, to choose, to try, to act, to be oneself, and so on is essential to the individual and collective survival. It is freedom to think that gives rise to new ideas and new inventions. Psychological freedom

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constitutes a fundamental condition in fostering constructive creativity. A person must be free to be himself if he is to create anything original. We can see that if man is to be guided by reasons, freedom must be a necessary condition. It is freedom to think, to feel, to choose, to act, to be oneself that will deliver man from imminent dangers of the present age and of the future to come. This explains why Abulad in his discussion on the future of man calls for more freedom and more reason in order that man may escape from being victims of the overwhelming oppressive environmental forces.

It should be noted that science itself does not create ends for man, the most it can do is to supply means by which certain ends may be obtained. Man himself must conceive of ends. Science, according to Nietzsche, only explains the course of nature, but it is man that interprets and evaluates it on some basis. Ultimate moral aims or general moral imperatives cannot be provided by science, though they can be deduced from its empirical findings. Man himself must create his own values to which he alone is responsible. If man is to be accountable for his action, it is because ultimate decisions and choices still lie

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205 Also see Peter van Inwagen, “Ability and Responsibility,” The Philosophical Review (April 1978), pp. 201-223.
within him. He must exercise his power of self-determination to decide and choose for himself.
Bibliography


